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Abstract 
In the light of almost every welfare and non-welfare 
scheme mandating Aadhaar, it becomes imperative to 
consider its inevitable implications. The Aadhaar, which 
was initially conceived for the benefit of BPL families, has 
been for over a decade forced upon every resident of 
India. The Supreme Court, in its judgement, while 
assenting Aadhaar, has adequately addressed the 
apprehension of the petitioners by striking off or reading 
down the impugned provisions which invariably set a 
new legislative agenda for the Parliament. Thus, this 
Paper attempts to analyse the provisions of Aadhaar, and 
the legal implications emanating there from. Through this 
paper, the authors will strenuously aver that though UID 
was initiated with the objective of streamlining the 
distribution of basic and fundamental services to the 
weaker sections, it has now turned into an all pervasive 
tool which has the potential of arming the Government, 
private corporate players and hackers with sensitive data.  
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I. Introduction 
Aadhaar has  been aptly dubbed as „Schrodinger‟s Aadhaar‟1, as on 
the one hand, the legislation  spells out that it is merely voluntary 
in nature, whereas on the other hand, the increasing appetite of the 
Government to include a multiplicity of schemes under the 
umbrella of Aadhaar, had made it, without a shadow of  doubt, 
inescapable. It had become the only gateway, to access Government 
and private services- from welfare schemes such as mid-day meal,2 
pensions of retired Defence Forces,3 and scholarships,4 to non-
welfare schemes including PAN card,5 bank accounts,6registration 
for NEET-20177and mobile verification.8 The issuance of 139 
notifications9 in this regard, solidified the omnipotence of Aadhaar. 
                                                          
1 Rochelle D‟ Souza, Schrodinger‟s Aadhaar, https://www.magzter.com/ 
articles/10238/254488/5a1f1db4c4db8 (last accessed on 29th October, 
2018).  
2  Ministry of Human Resource Development, Notifications under Section 7 
of Aadhaar Act,2016 for Mid day meal scheme, http://mdm.nic.in/ 
Files/CCH_Notification/Gazette%20Notification-CCH-MDM-28-2-
2017.pdf(last accessed on 15th April, 2018).  
3 Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare, Ministry of Defence, Notification 
S.O. 747 (E),http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2017/174639.pdf  (last 
accessed on 15th April, 2018). 
4 University Grants Commission D.O. No. F. 8-2/2016, 
www.ugc.ac.in/pdfnews/4792000_Aadhaar-.pdf (last accessed on 15th 
April, 2018). 
5 The Finance Act, §56, No. 7, Acts of Parliament, 2017 (India).  
6Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Second 
Amendment Rules, 2017, Ministry of Finance, 
http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2017/176407.pdf  (last accessed on 
15th April, 2018). 
7 Central Board of Secondary Education, ,Requirement of Aadhaar for 
applicants of NEET-2017, http://cbse.nic.in/newsite/ attach/ 
NOTIFICATIN%20FOR%20AADHAR-final.pdf (last accessed on 15th 
April, 2018).  
8, Ministry of Communications Access Services Cell File No 800-26/2016-AS 
II, http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Re-verification% 20 
extension.PDF  (last accessed on 15th April, 2018). 
9 Mehal Jain, SC extends deadline for mandatory linkage of Aadhaar with all 
schemes and services to March 31, Live Law.in (December 15, 2017) 
https://www.livelaw.in/breaking-sc-extends-deadline-mandatory-
Naved and Kaushal           Aadhaar: Implementations & Implication 
3 
 
It perpetuates an undeniable deviation from the fundamental facet 
of a democratic republic, by creating a viable atmosphere to bring 
about a shift from „We the people‟ to „We the Government‟. The 
State devised a scheme that compromised the individual‟s right to 
privacy, thereby, acquiring unbridled powers that, if misused, had 
the potential to serve as instruments for creation of a virtual 
panoptic. It turned into an all pervasive tool which had the 
potential of arming the Government, private corporate players and 
hackers with sensitive data. 
The scope of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and other 
Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to 
as the “Act”) has been considerably restricted by therecent, 
mammoth judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Justice K.S. 
Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.10 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Aadhaar judgment”). While upholding the legitimacy 
of Aadhaar by 4:1 majority, the Supreme Court held that the Act 
passes the muster of the three-fold test as formulated in Justice K.S. 
Puttaswamy(Retd.) and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.11 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Privacy judgment”), and more importantly, meets 
the test of proportionality whose principles seek to safeguard 
citizens from excessive Government measures.12As opposed to the 
four judges who labelled Aadhaar as constitutionally valid, the 
vehement dissent of Justice Dr. D.Y.Chandrachud, strikes a note of 
caution against the structure of Aadhaar. It would be safe to 
conclude that his argument was the lynchpin that propelled the 
final judgement given the fierceness and the conviction with which 
the opinion was presented. Dissent „cancels the monolithic 
solidarity‟ on which the authority of court depends.13 
                                                                                                                                    
linkage-aadhaar-schemes-services-march-31/ (last accessed on 22nd 
August, 2018).  
10 2018 S.C.C. OnLine S.C. 1642. 
11 (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1. 
12Supra note 10. 
13 Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights, 72 Harvard University Press, 1958. See 
also Krithika Ashok, Disinclined to Dissent? A Study of Supreme Court of 
India, Vol. 1 Indian Law Review 7, 11 (2017) 
http://dspace.jgu.edu.in:8080/ jspui/bitstream/ 10739/941/1/ 
Disinclined  % 20to%20dissent %20A%20study%20of %20the% 20 
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2. Background and Legal Lacunas 
In order to comprehend the implications of Aadhaar, it would be 
fitting to trace the development of the scheme from its inception to 
its end. The concept of Unique Identification (UID) was first 
conceived in 2006, when the administrative approval for „Unique 
ID for Below Poverty Line (BPL) families‟ was given by the 
Department of Information Technology and the Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology. Although this 
scheme was originally intended for BPL families, it has been 
gradually extended to all the citizens of India, making it mandatory 
for availing amyriad of welfare and non-welfare schemes. 
In due course, a Processes Committee was set up to suggest 
processes for the upgradation, modification, addition and deletion 
of data fields from the core database under the project, which 
eventually facilitated the formation of  a UID Authority. 
Subsequently, Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) was 
constituted, with the approval of the then Prime Minister Mr. 
Manmohan Singh, to review the scheme. In the course of four 
meetings undertaken by the EGoM, they established a UID 
Authority as an executive Authority under the Planning 
Commission for five years; after the completion of which, a 
decision was to be taken in relation to the location of the Unique 
Identification Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as 
“UIDAI”)  
Ultimately, the UIDAI was constituted in pursuance of the 
executive powers of the Government on 28th January, 2009 as an 
attached office under the aegis of the Planning Commission.14 The 
reason behind not bestowing UIDAI with statutory status at the 
time of its initiation, according to the Ministry of Planning, was to 
ensure better coordination with different departments.15However, 
                                                                                                                                    
Supreme %20Court%20of%20India.pdf (last accessed on: 5th October, 
2018). 
14 Planning Commission, Government of India, Notification No. A-
43011/02/2009 Admn. I, https://uidai.gov.in/ images/ notification _28_ 
jan_2009.pdf (last accessed on 6th April, 2018). 
15 Standing Committee on Finance, Lok Sabha, The National Identification 
Authority of India Bill, 2010 
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keeping in mind that the Government was attempting to create the 
world‟s largest biometric database based on the national identity 
project, this rationale seems both implausible and confounding. Be 
that as it may, the UIDAI started enrolling residents after obtaining 
their demographic and biometric data. Intriguingly, this was being 
done in the absence of any robust framework for protection of such 
vast and sensitive data. 
An important question that arises in this context is, regarding the 
authority that was vested in the UIDAI to carry out its operations, 
since its inception. The Ministry of Planning justified their 
authority by stating that there were no legal constraints in the 
collection of such data, since the powers of the Executive are co-
extensive with that of the legislature.16 However, as a point of 
information, it is pertinent to note that this reasoning did not 
satiate the Standing Committee on Finance,17 since the bill 
regarding the same was underway in Parliament. 
The National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 failed to 
pass in the Parliament, particularly after the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Finance, rejected the Bill and urged the 
Government to reconsider and review the UID scheme. However, 
disregarding the recommendation, the Government continued 
enrolling residents under the Aadhaar scheme, in the exercise of 
their executive powers, before the Act was passed in2016. At this 
juncture, it becomes indispensable to consider the legitimacy of 
such erstwhile actions taken by the Central Government which 
have been, incidentally, retrospectively validated by Section 59 of 
the Act. The absence of a legislative framework for the Aadhaar 
project between 2009 and 2016, left the biometric data of millions of 
Indian citizens bereft of the protection that the sensitivity of the 
data collected necessitates, in order to comprehensively protect and 
enforce the right to privacy.18 Despite this, the majority in the 
Aadhaar verdict did not   invalidate the enrolments that were made 
prior to the passing of this Act. In comparison to the expenditure 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/UID/uid%20report.pdf (last 
accessed on 4th March, 2018). 
16Id. 
17Id. 
18Supra note 10. 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 8, No.1                              ISSN 2278-4322 
 
6 
 
that would inevitably be incurred in repeating the enrolment 
process,  the costs of validating Section 59 was considerably less 
and therefore deemed to be more feasible. In order to keep the 
validation (of Section 59) in line with democratic ideals, the court 
ordered the elicitation of „consent‟ from every person who was 
enrolled prior to the passing of the Act.  19However, the court 
remained silent on the manner in which the said consent is to be 
elicited.  In the Aadhaar Handbook of 201020 and 201321, the 
following guideline finds mention:  
“In the interest of transparency, it is recommended that the 
Registrar inform the resident that they will be keeping the 
biometric data and also define how the data will be used and how 
it will be kept secure”.  
Since the handbook is merely „recommendatory‟ in nature, it has no 
binding effect on the Registrar. Thus, a reasonable speculation of 
the consent obtained and its potential illegality arises. The 
importance of an informed consent has more to it, than meets the 
eye. Justice A.P. Shah, the Privacy judgment, and the Justice B.N. 
Srikrishna Committee Report, highlight and stress on the 
importance of informed consent making it the primary basis to 
process personal data must be individual consent.22 
Furthermore, the Act was passed during the Budget Session, when 
the matter pertaining to Aadhaar was still pending before the 
Supreme Court. The Parliament evidently did not supersede its 
powers as the rule of sub judice fails to apply23. To draw an analogy, 
                                                          
19Supra note 10. 
20 UIDAI (Planning Commission), Aadhaar Handbook for Registrars 
(2010),  
http://indiamicrofinance.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Aadhaar-
Handbook. pdf, at page 11 (last accessed on 9th October, 2018). 
21UIDAI (Planning Commission), Aadhaar Handbook for Registrars (2013) 
https://archive.org/stream/aadhaar_handbook_registrars_v3_04062013/
aadhaar_handbook_registrars_v3_04062013_djvu.txt (last accssed on 9th 
October 2018). 
22Infra note 124.  
23 Chapter 26- General Rules of Procedure, Rajya Sabha at Work 772, 775 
https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/rsat_work/archive/chapter-26.pdf (last 
accessed on 20th September, 2018). 
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the representative case of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill, 1986 may be taken, where objections were raised 
regarding the consideration of the Bill, when the matter in relation 
to it, was still pending before the Court. The Chairman, in the 
aforementioned case, ruled that „sovereign bodies have the power 
to legislate on any matter, irrespective of its pending status before a 
Court‟24 An argument was brought out along the same lines with 
respect to the passing of the Aadhaar Bill, stating that the pendency 
of a challenge regarding an Executive action, in front of the 
Supreme Court, does not suspend the right of the Parliament to 
legislate.25 
Nonetheless, the question as to whether the Government was 
justified in introducing Aadhaar as a Money Bill demands 
consideration.  Passing  the legislation as a Money Bill secured the 
successful passage of the Bill by bringing it under the ambit of the 
special procedure that is elucidated under Article 109 of the 
Constitution of India; that gives the Rajya Sabha‟s 
recommendations a mere persuasive value as opposed to a binding 
one. The introduction of the Bill as a Money Bill, did not require the 
reference of the Parliamentary Committee, which was unjustified 
since a further deliberation by such a Committee would have 
undoubtedly strengthened the mechanism of the largest biometric 
database such as Aadhaar. The Aadhaar judgment by a majority 
validated the passing of the Bill as a Money Bill by opining that 
Section 7 of the Act was the “core provision” and that the residuary 
provisions were merely incidental to it.26In contrast, the rational 
employed in the dissenting opinion is much more compelling - the 
main object of the Act was to create a national identity, and even 
though the Preamble succeeding in colouring the legislation as a 
Money Bill with shrew drafting, the substantive provisions of the 
Act do not conform to the object specified in Preamble and thus 
travel far beyond the boundaries of a Money Bill.27 Section 7 was 
                                                          
24Id. 
25 Statement by Mr. Arun Jaitley, The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial 
and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016, Rajya Sabha 
(16/03/2016). 
26Supra note 10. 
27Supra note 10. 
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opined to simply be a provision that imposes a requirement for 
authentication. For this reason, it was remarked that such action of 
superseding the authority of Rajya Sabha “constitutes a fraud on 
the Constitution.”Moreover, Section 57 of the Act does not justify 
the passage of the Bill as a Money Bill. This provision in variably 
opens a Pandora‟s Box, for, the introduction of corporate bodies 
into the equation will inevitably intrude into the pre-established 
trustee relationship between the Government and its citizens, 
especially when sensitive information is involved. While briefly 
touching on this point in the Lok Sabha, the Hon‟ble Finance 
Minister, Mr. Arun Jaitley stated that, he could not bar other 
authorities. 28In fact, an Amendment to the bill was recommended 
by the Rajya Sabha for the deletion of the said provision. However, 
the recommendation was rejected. Although the Aadhaar judgment 
reflects that section 57, in its current form, will be susceptible to 
commercial exploitation; all three opinions manifest a varied 
degree of disinclination towards the section as it stands. Dr. D.Y. 
Chandrachud, while being conscious of the fact that the impugned 
section may also lead to “individual profiling” held that the section 
altogether does not pass the constitutional muster, and that the 
Parliament has travelled far beyond its stated purpose in the 
Preamble of the Act. On the other hand, the concurring opinion 
holds only part of section 57 unconstitutional, in as much as it 
allows establishing the identity of a resident pursuant to „any 
contract‟ to this effect. The majority opinion intriguingly reflects 
substantial lack of clarity on the fate of section 57. Consequently, 
this has given rise to confusion, which has resulted in speculations 
regarding the role of corporate bodies, which will continue to loom 
over, until definite instructions are issued from the concerned 
Ministries/ Regulatory Authorities.29The root of this confusion is 
embedded in the judgment itself, as the majority opinion at various 
instances mentions that only „a portion‟ or „a part of‟ section 57 is 
                                                          
28 Statement by Mr. Arun Jaitley, The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial 
and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016, Lok Sabha 
(11/03/2016). 
29 Samarth Bansal, Supreme Court Judgment on Aadhaar leads to confusion in 
private sector, Hindustan Times (September, 27th, 2018) (last accessed on 
28th September, 2018). 
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held unconstitutional, without spelling out the unconstitutional 
facets definitely.  
Insofar as Section 57 in the present form is concerned, it is 
susceptible to misuse inasmuch as: (a) It can be used for 
establishing the identity of an individual „for any purpose‟. We 
read down this provision to mean that such a purpose has to be 
backed by law. Further, whenever any such “law” is made, it 
would be subject to judicial scrutiny. (b) Such purpose is not 
limited pursuant to any law alone but can be done pursuant to 
„any contract to this effect‟ as well. This is clearly impermissible 
as a contractual provision is not backed by a law and, therefore, 
first requirement of proportionality test is not met. (c) Apart from 
authorising the State, even „any body corporate or person‟ is 
authorised to avail authentication services which can be on the 
basis of purported agreement between an individual and such 
body corporate or person. Even if we presume that legislature did 
not intend so, the impact of the aforesaid features would be to 
enable commercial exploitation of an individual biometric and 
demographic information by the private entities. Thus, this part of 
the provision which enables body corporate and individuals also to 
seek authentication, that too on the basis of a contract between the 
individual and such body corporate or person, would impinge 
upon the right to privacy of such individuals. This part of the 
section, thus, is declared unconstitutional.30 
The court having merely narrowed the ambit of the first leg of 
section 57, has not held it unconstitutional in toto. Although, the 
role of corporate bodies in seeking authentication „pursuant to a 
contract‟ has been held unconstitutional, the irrepressible question 
that arises is whether corporate bodies will be restricted in seeking 
authentication, when it is backed by a law. The patent assertion in 
the judgment that “if a person voluntary offers Aadhaar card as a 
proof of his/her identity, there may not be a problem” insinuates 
that corporate bodies may not be completely forbidden from using 
Aadhaar. This undoubtedly leaves a new legislative agenda for the 
Parliament. 
                                                          
30Supra note 10. 
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3.Supreme Court on Aadhaar 
Aadhaar‟s journey has been a roller coaster ride, right from its 
inception, which has resulted in a tussle between the Judiciary and 
Legislature. Prior to the inception of the Act, the Supreme Court 
was against mandating Aadhaar. The first order of the Court in this 
regard was on23rdSeptember, 2013, when it directed that no person 
shall suffer due to the non-possession of Aadhaar, in spite of 
various circulars making it mandatory.31 Then, in March 2015, a 3-
Judges bench, while noting that despite its previous order, Aadhaar 
identification is being insisted upon by various authorities, asked 
the Union of India, States, and all their functionaries to abide by 
their previous order dated 23rd September, 2013.32Further, in 
March, 2014, the Supreme Court directed that no person shall be 
deprived of any service for want of Aadhaar number, in case 
he/she is otherwise eligible/entitled. And accordingly, all the 
authorities were directed to modify their forms/circulars/likes so 
as to not compulsorily require the Aadhaar number, in order to 
meet the requirement of the interim order passed by the Court.33In 
August, 2015, the Court further directed the Government to inter 
alia convey, using electronic and print media, that the obtaining of 
Aadhaar is not mandatory and, that the production of Aadhaar 
shall not be a condition precedent for availing any benefit that is 
otherwise due.34Finally, in October, 2015, the Court while 
impressing upon the respondents to strictly follow its previous 
orders, stated that the Aadhaar scheme is purely voluntary „and 
cannot be made mandatory‟ till the matter is finally decided by the 
Court, one way or the other.35 
Even after the commencement of the Act, the Supreme Court 
retained its earlier view. In its order dated 14th September, 2016, in 
                                                          
31 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, 2013 (12) SCALE 232. 
(India)  
32 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, 
MANU/SCOR/22662/2015. 
33 Unique Identification Authority of India v. Central Bureau of 
Investigation, (2017) 7 S.C.C. 157. 
34 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, 2015 (8) SCALE 747. 
35 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, 
MANU/SCOR/11831/2015. 
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the case of All Bengal Minority Students Council v. Union of India,36 
the Supreme Court while taking note of the order in October, 2015, 
stayed the operation and the implementation of impugned letters 
mandating Aadhaar for pre-matric, post-matric and merit-cum-
means scholarships. Subsequently, the Supreme Court appeared to 
be nonchalant when the Government brazenly violated its order. 
However, the Supreme Court‟s view started shifting, when vide its 
order dated 6th February, 2017 in Lokniti Foundation v. Union of India 
and Ors.,37 gave its approval to the Government for the re-
verification of the existing subscribers using Aadhaar. Intriguingly, 
this order failed to consider and reflect the previous orders given in 
relation to Aadhaar.  
Ultimately, the Court rendered a judgment in favour of Aadhaar 
when it upheld the constitutional validity of Section 139AA of 
Income Tax Act, 1961 as introduced by the Finance Act, 
201738which mandated the linking of Aadhaar-PAN as a 
prerequisite to file an income tax return. However, in the case of 
Binoy Viswam v. Union of India,39Justice A.K. Sikri, and Justice 
Ashok Bhushan had partially put a stay on this provision and 
directed that unless the question of the right to privacy is decided, 
which was at that time pending before the Constitutional Bench, 
only a prospective effect shall be given to it. The question which 
arose for consideration in this case inter alia was whether the 
impugned provision i.e. section 139AA of Income Tax Act, 1961 
violated Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution which the Court 
answered in the negative.  
Apart from this, an important question which was addressed in 
Binoy Viswam40 was whether the procuring of Aadhaar was 
optional or obligatory. This issue arose because of the opposing 
views of the parties pertaining to the true interpretation of proviso 
to section 7 of the Act. On the one hand, the petitioners contended 
that this proviso, which offers an alternate and viable means of 
identification, implies that the Act is voluntary, while on the other 
                                                          
36 MANU/SCOR/20730/2016. 
37 2017 (6) SCALE 698. 
38Supra note 5. 
39 (2017) 7 S.C.C. 59. (India) 
40Id. 
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hand, the respondents were of the view that this proviso is only an 
interim measure in a scenario where the Aadhaar application has 
been made but the individual has not yet received the Aadhaar 
number. Furthermore, there was bedlam in the Courtroom as to 
whether the Government can make Aadhaar voluntary under the 
Aadhaar Act, while simultaneously mandating it under the Income 
Tax Act, 1961. The Court, after pondering upon whether the two 
statutes should be harmoniously construed, finally buried the 
hatchet by observing that “it is the prerogative of the Parliament to 
make a particular provision directory in one statute and 
mandatory/compulsory in other.”While holding so, the Court 
relied on the judgment in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
v. Shiv Shanker41 wherein it was held that if the object of the two 
statutes is different and the language of both is restricted to its own 
object, then they are intended to run on parallel lines and there 
would be no real conflict even though it may appear to be so on the 
surface. Similarly, the impugned section is only repugnant to the 
provision of the Aadhaar Act. Since there is a presumption against 
the doctrine of implied repeal and the two provisions are not 
„irreconcilable‟ per se, the Court was judicious in holding that there 
is no implied repeal in the instant case.  
Additionally, an argument put forth by the petitioners before the 
benches in Binoy Viswam and Aadhaar judgment was that the spate 
of administrative orders under section 7 of the Act are violative of 
the previous orders of the court which repeatedly opined that 
Aadhaar should not be made mandatory. The argument failed to 
impress upon the Court, since it was of the opinion that the earlier 
orders were in respect of the Aadhaar „scheme‟ and not the statute. 
The majority opinion in the Aadhaar judgment was of the same 
view and endorsed the reasoning given in BinoyViswam judgment. 
It is, however, pertinent to note that both BinoyViswamand majority 
opinion in the Aadhaar judgment again failed to take into 
consideration the order in All Bengal Minority Student 
Council,42which was pronounced after the Act came into force. At 
the same time, the bench in Aadhaar judgment was also of the view 
that it would have been better, had a clarification been obtained 
                                                          
41 (1971) 1 S.C.C. 442. 
42Supra note 36. 
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from the Court after the passing of the Aadhaar Act before issuing 
such circulars and orders. 
The lone dissenter in the Aadhaar judgment, Justice Dr. DY 
Chandrachud, expressed serious concerns over the disobedience of 
the interim orders of Supreme Court. The orders of the Court are 
not recommendatory – they are binding directions of a 
constitutional adjudicator.43He categorically stated that, “If we 
were not to enforce a punctilious compliance with our own 
directions by government, that would ring a death – knell of the 
institutional position of the Supreme Court.”44After all, interim 
orders are based on prima facie findings to ensure that the matter 
does not become either infructuous or fait accompli before the final 
hearing.45 
4. Issue of Privacy 
4.1 Concerns 
P.N. Bhagwati, J. has rightly opined that Article 21 is of the „widest 
amplitude‟,46 and its rippling effect can be seen in the Supreme 
Court‟s historic and unanimous judgment declaring right to 
privacy as a part and parcel of Article 21. Right to privacy, in its 
simplest sense, allows each human being to be left alone in a core 
which is inviolable.47However, Aadhaar in its initial form was 
doing the exact opposite. It was becoming a bridge across our data, 
leading towards the establishment of a digital colony, which is 
susceptible to blitz, at the hands of hackers. The report based on the 
study conducted by The Centre for Internet and Society, a non-
profit organisation, further shows the vulnerability of such data. It 
was estimated that 130-135 million Aadhaar numbers have been 
leaked and estimated the bank account number leaks around 100 
million.48Moreover, in the Lok Sabha‟s unstarred question no. 574 
                                                          
43Supra note 10. 
44Supra note 10. 
45 State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka, (2009) 5 S.C.C. 694. 
46Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 A.I.R. S.C. 597.  
47 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 S.C.C. 1. 
48 Amber Sinha and Srinivas Kodali, Information Security Practices of 
Aadhaar (or lack thereof), The Centre for Internet and Society 3, (May 2017), 
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dated 19th July 2017, the Minister of State for Electronics and 
Information Technology while replying to a query posed, 
regarding the leakage of Aadhaar data, stated that, “it has been 
found that 210 websites of the Central Government and State Government 
Departments including educational institutions, displayed the list of 
beneficiaries along with their name, addresses, other details and Aadhaar 
numbers for the information of general public.”Instances of adverse 
effect on informational privacy at hands of corporate bodies are 
numerous. It was reported that in July, 2017,there was a breach in 
the data of Jio users that was posted on a website named 
magicapk.com.49. Furthermore, allegations had been levelled 
against Bharti Airtel and Airtel Payment Bank bringing out that at 
the time of mobile verification using Aadhaar based e-KYC, Airtel 
retailers opened Airtel Payment Bank accounts, without the 
informed consent of the users. Besides, Government‟s LPG 
subsidies were also being transferred to these accounts. As a result, 
more than 23 lakh customers had reportedly received as much as 
Rs. 47 crore in their Airtel bank accounts, the existence of which 
they were not aware of.  Ultimately, after much ado, UIDAI 
through its interim order, temporarily barred Bharti Airtel and 
Airtel Payment Bank from conducting Aadhaar based SIM 
verification using e-KYC, and also e-KYC bank payments to 
clients.50The resentment towards Aadhaar is essentially for the 
initial form in which it was formulated, which in the absence of any 
privacy legislation is compulsive and unbolted. The Delhi High 
                                                                                                                                    
https://cis-india.org/internet.../information-security-practices-of-
aadhaar-or-lack-there (last accessed on 28th March, 2018).  
49 Tech Desk, Reliance Jio data breach: Here‟s why it is a big deal, what it means 
for users and more¸ Indian Express, (July 11th, 2017) 
https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/tech-news-
technology/reliance-jio-data-breached-120-million-users-why-it-matters-
what-it-means-for-you-and-everything-to-know-4743592/ (last accessed 
on 17th July, 2018). 
50 PTI, UIDAI suspends Airtel, Airtel Payment Bank‟s Ekyclicence, The Hindu, 
(December 16th, 2017) 
https://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/uidai-suspends-airtel-
airtel-payments-banks-ekyc-licence/article21822439.ece (last accessed on 
17th March, 2018). 
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Court, in September, 2018, issued a suomotu PIL.51 A few FIRs were 
brought to the attention of the Court that highlighted as to how, 
during the Aadhaar verification, the accused on the pretext that the 
thumb impression was not obtained properly, took another one. 
This, along with the copy of the documents, was used to issue 
another SIM, which was then used in facilitating identity theft and 
identity fraud.  In a different slant, another example, showing the 
growing trivialness of the fundamental right to privacy, by private 
players is of Trust ID. It advertises itself as “India‟s first mobile 
application to help verify anyone using their Aadhaar ID in less 
than one minute”52 and thus provides a “comprehensive 
verification service on a single platform including ID based 
verification, criminal background verification based on eCourt 
records, social media profiling based on email-id, negative news 
scan on a name based…”.53 
Furthermore, an investigation was carried out by The Tribune, a 
Chandigarh based English daily newspaper,  which revealed that, 
the details of Aadhaar holders were accessible through WatsApp, 
via a portal made available byan anonymous seller, by simply 
feeding an individual‟s Aadhaar number, for as little as Rs. 
500.54This investigative journalism was commended by famed 
whistle-blower Edward Snowden, a former CIA employee and 
NSA analyst who advocated  that such records are always subject 
                                                          
51 Manish Bansal v. State of N.C.T. of Delhi, Crl. M.A. No. 31411/ 2018 
(exemption). See also, Akanksha Jain, Misuse of Aadhaar Verification, 
Linkage Process: HC Worried About Disastrous Consequences, Registers Suo 
Motu PIL, Livelaw (September 13th, 2018) https://www.livelaw.in/ 
misuse-of-aadhaar-verification-linkage-process-hc-worried-about-
disastrous-consequences-registers-suo-motu-pil-read-order/ (last 
accessed on: 10th October, 2018). 
52https://www.trustid.in/faq (last accessed on 6th April, 2018). 
53Id. 
54 Tribune Investigation, Rs 500, 10 minutes, and you have access to billion 
Aadhaar details, Tribune India, (January 4th, 2018), 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/snowden-says-
programmes-like-aadhaar-result-in-abuse/article22403424.ece (last 
accessed on 17th April, 2018). 
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to  abuse, and insinuated that the perpetrators of UIDAI be arrested 
for violating the privacy of a billion Indians.55 
The court in the Aadhaar judgment took note of „various‟ news 
reports which have reported hacking into the Aadhaar website. 
However, since the judges in the majority opinion took notice of 
those news report which surfaced after the conclusion of hearing in 
the Aadhaar case, and consequently, counsels could not be heard 
upon the veracity of such reports, the court left this aspect to the 
wisdom of UIDAI “in hope that Central Identities Data Repository 
would find out the ways and means to curb any such tendency.”56 
Apart from such appalling occurrences, a whammy article on social 
media which caused everyone to raise an eyebrow was of the 
famous cricketer M.S. Dhoni, whose Aadhaar details were made 
public by an enrolling agency.57In this hue, a question regarding 
compensation in instances involving the leakage of private 
information was raised in the Lok Sabha, marked as unstarred 
question no. 1827 dated 26th July 2017. Mr P.P. Chaudhary, Minister 
of State for Electronics and Information Technologies replied that 
there is no proposal/provision for providing compensation to individuals 
in this regard. At present, the only viable option left to seek damages 
by the aggrieved person is by way of section 43A of Information 
Technology Act, 2000 which provides for compensation by a “body 
corporate” when it fails to have “reasonable security practices and 
procedures.” A petition has already been filed before the Delhi 
High Court by Prof. Shamnad Basheer, against UIDAI seeking 
exemplary damages for Aadhaar data breach, inter alia under 
                                                          
55 Sruthi Radhakrishnan, Snowden says programmes like Aadhaar result in 
abuse, The Hindu, (January 9th, 2018), 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/snowden-says-
programmes-like-aadhaar-result-in-abuse/article22403424.ece (last 
accessed on 17th April, 2018). 
56Supra note 10. 
57 Express Web Desk, MS Dhoni‟s Aadhaar details made public, Ravi Shankar 
Prasad promises action, Indian Express (March 29th, 2017), 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/sakshi-dhoni-raises-privacy-
issue-after-ms-dhoni-aadhaar-details-made-public-on-twitter-ravi-
shankar-prasad-promises-action-4590310/ (last accessed on18th April, 
2018). 
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section 43A of Information Technology Act, 2000.It is to be noted 
herein that section 43A does not extend to government 
organisations/ agencies.58Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that 
the action is likely to succeed in as much as it relates to section 43A.  
In any case, the High Courts in many other such proceedings were 
waiting for the outcome of the Supreme Court in the Aadhaar 
judgment, which will now guide all respective courts in similar 
matters. Furthermore, Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee Report,59 
which was constituted to deliberate on a broader aspect of personal 
data protection, has inter alia recommended that the payment of 
compensation, both jointly and severally, be a levied in case of 
breach of data fiduciaries. On a similar footing, even the dissenting 
opinion in the Aadhaar judgment remarked about the exigent need 
of providing a right to compensation.60 
The citizens are being coerced to part with their core biometric 
information for the purpose of authentication, failing which, the 
entitlement to welfare benefits like scholarships, pensions, mid-day 
meal that they are otherwise legitimately eligible to claim, is robbed 
from them. Thus, the undeniable question is whether the State‟s 
authority to discharge its constitutional and statutory obligations, is 
conditional upon an individual parting with his or her core 
biometrics. The Government appears to have imposed the doctrine 
of „unconstitutional condition‟ which means any stipulation 
imposed upon the grant of a Governmental privilege, which in 
effect requires the recipient of the privilege to relinquish some 
constitutional right.61 Thus, even though a resident may otherwise 
be legitimately entitled to a welfare benefit from the Government, 
he/she can be bereft of this right merely for want of Aadhaar. It has 
been held in the Aadhaar judgement that the scope of ‟benefits‟ and 
                                                          
58 Data Security Council of India, Reasonable Security Practices- I..T. 
Amendment Act, 2008, October 10th, 2018 (last accessed on 11th October, 
2018) 
https://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/Reasonable_Security_Practices_
Under_IT_Amendment_Act2008.pdf. 
59Infra note 125. 
60Supra note 10. 
61 The Ahemdabad St. Xavier‟s Society v. State of Gujarat (1974) 1 S.C.C. 
717. 
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„subsidies‟ is to be strictly construed and be limited to welfare 
schemes only. As a result, possession of Aadhaar cannot be a 
condition precedent for procurement of benefit, which is earned by 
an individual, including pension schemes.62The consequences of 
such a compulsion were alarming, with deaths being reported, 
mainly from vulnerable groups, since inter alia they find 
themselves excluded from the Public Distribution System (PDS) for 
want of Aadhaar.63In a recent case, a woman was reportedly denied 
admission in Gurugram hospital during her labour, and 
consequentially was forced to give birth outside the hospital 
because of her inability to furnish an Aadhaar card, even though 
she had her Aadhaar number.64 Such incidents coupled with other 
factors such as electricity outage, internet connectivity issues etc., 
have forced the UIDAI to issue a statement saying that no essential 
services should be denied for want of Aadhaar and alternate 
identity/mechanism be provided.65 
4.2 Insufficient Measures 
The preceding paragraphs examine the security measures taken by 
the Government for the protection of data, and analyse whether 
they are sufficient. In Lok Sabha‟s unstarred question no. 1758, 
dated 26th July, 2017, the Government has taken aid of section 70 of 
                                                          
62Supra note 10. 
63 Jean Dreze, Following the grain trail: on India‟s Public Distribution System, 
The Hindu, (January 17th, 2018) https://www.thehindu.com/ 
opinion/lead/following-the-grain-trail/article22451645.ece (last accessed 
on 21st March, 2018); Deepshikha Ghosh, No Aadhaar, No food? Girl, 11, died 
„begging for rice‟, says Jharkhand family, N.D.T.V. (October 17th, 2017) 
https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/no-aadhaar-no-food-11-year-old-
girl-died-begging-for-rice-says-jharkhand-family-1763863 (last accessed 
on 20th March, 2018). 
64 Sakshi Dayal, No Aadhaar, Gurgaon hospital turns away woman, she gives 
birth right outside¸ Indian Express, (February 10th, 2018) 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/no-aadhaar-hospital-turns-
away-woman-she-gives-birth-right-outside-5058006/ (last accessed on 20th 
March, 2018). 
65 U.I.D.A.I., Government of India, Exception handling in Public Distribution 
Services and other welfare schemes¸ Circular No. 23011/Gen/2014/Legal-
UIDAI (last accessed on 10th October, 2018) https:// uidai.gov.in/ 
images/tenders/Circular_relating_to_Exception_handling_25102017.pdf. 
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The Information Technology Act, 2000,to solidify its stance on the 
existence of adequate measures in this regard. In accordance with 
this section, Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) was 
declared a „Protected System‟ in December 2015,66 thereby meaning 
that a high quantum of punishment would be meted out against 
anyone attempting to gain unauthorised access to CIDR. 
Undoubtedly, it was a step in the right direction. However, the 
worrisome fact remains that, other databases like that of banks, 
cellular companies etc. to which Aadhaar is being compulsorily 
linked to, are not protected. Since it is neither expedient nor 
feasible for the Government to declare every system as a protected 
system, the data will inevitably be exposed to vulnerability. 
Individually, these information silos may seem inconsequential. In 
aggregation, they disclose the nature of the personality, including 
food habits, language, health, hobbies, sexual preferences, 
friendships, ways of dress and political affiliation.67Elaborating 
upon it, the dissenting opinion in Aadhaar judgment appears to 
provide helpful insight, by way of an international case law 
decided by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal 
Republic of Germany.68 It was observed therein that distinct silos of 
data “can be pieced together with other data collections, 
particularly when individual integrated information systems are 
built up – to add up to a partial or virtually complete personality 
profile.”69The majority opinion in Aadhaar was antithetical to this. 
By adverting to the arguments of respondents, the majority seems 
to be satiated with the reasoning that merging of silos is 
„prohibited‟. To argue that the structure of Aadhaar can „never‟ be 
hacked or interfered with, is a little far-fetched. Even the Pentagon 
can and has been hacked.70 It appears as if the dread of several 
                                                          
66 Department of Electronic and Information Technology, Ministry of 
Communications and Information Technology. NotificationG.S.R. 993(E) 
http://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/UIDAI%20CII%20notification%
20Dec15.pdf(last accessed on 25th March, 2018).  
67Supra note 10. 
68 Federal Census Act Case, (1983) BVerfGE 1. 
69Supra note 10. 
70 Michael Mimoso, Meet David Dworken, the teenager who hacked the 
Pentagon, The Christian Science Monitor (July 5th, 2016) 
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Security-
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critics is well –founded; that it is not a matter of „if‟ but „when‟ such 
sensitive data inter-linked to multiple databases might leak. 
Additionally, it may also be noted, that in the garb of this 
provision, UIDAI was able to turn down an RTI query asking for 
information on cases of fake and duplicate Aadhaar, on the 
grounds of “national security”.71 
Another specious argument put forth by the Government is that, 
highest standards have been set with respect to protecting one‟s 
privacy, supporting their argument with the help of Section 5 and 6 
of Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016. While the former 
section mandatorily places a duty on the part of requesting entity 
to apprise the Aadhaar number holder of the alternative of 
submission of identity information, the latter section directs 
requesting entity to obtain consent of the Aadhaar number holder, 
in physical or electronic form, in order to maintain logs of the same. 
However, in India, the devil lies in implementation. The most 
substantial example in relation to this context is of Reliance Jio, 
which crossed its 100 million mark, whereby all subscribers had to 
authenticate through Aadhaar, before buying the SIM. On ground 
reality, it appears that the process had been undertaken in total 
contravention of the above-mentioned sections.72 It was most likely 
to follow as, apart from poor implementation which was without 
requisite oversight, there are complications in relation to these 
sections in itself. This is on account of the absence of any 
specification in the said Regulations, pertaining to defined options 
or procedure, which is to be given to the Aadhaar number holder, 
                                                                                                                                    
culture/2016/0705/Meet-David-Dworken-the-teenager-who-hacked-the-
Pentagon (last accessed on 30th August, 2018). 
71 PTI, UIDAI denies information on fake Aadhaar cards, says it might affect 
national security, Financial Express, (June 11th, 2017) 
https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/uidai-denies-
information-on-fake-aadhaar-cards-says-it-might-affect-national-
security/712257/ (last accessed on 21st June, 2018).  
72 Manu Subastian, Use of Aadhaar to get Mobile SIM Connections: Legal 
Issues Involved, Live Law.in (December 5th, 2017) https:// 
www.livelaw.in/use-aadhaar-get-mobile-sim-connections-legal-issues-
involved/ (last accessed on: 2nd October, 2018). 
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in such circumstances.73 The same apprehension was also exhibited 
in the dissenting opinion of Aadhaar judgment.74 
At this point, it may be noted that section 47(1) of the Act puts a bar 
in nature of limitation, where a court can take cognizance of an 
offence punishable under the Act only on a complaint made by 
UIDAI or any officer/person authorised by it. The Act or the 
accompanying Regulations does not enumerate whether the UIDAI 
is required to give details of any complaint that is made, or why it 
chooses to drop any specific complaint which gives carte blanche to 
initiate criminal proceedings, while also opening doors to increased 
bureaucracy. In the Aadhaar judgment, while the concurring 
opinion of Justice Ashok Bhushan, upheld the validity of impugned 
provision, by interpreting it to encompass situations where UIDAI 
can initiate complaint on its own motion,„ or at the request of an 
aggrieved person‟, the majority judgment expressed its „hope‟ that 
the provision should be suitably amended in order to include 
initiation of complaint by the person, whose rights has been 
adversely affected. Regardless, Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, in his 
dissenting judgment opined that the impugned section „violates the 
right to seek remedy‟. It may be conceded that there are similar 
provisions in some other statutes akin to section 47 of the Act, 
whose validity has been upheld. However, as pointed out in the 
dissenting opinion, the fact that there is no grievance redressal 
mechanism, if breach is committed by UIDAI, along with the fact 
that UIDAI lacks requisite autonomy for its proper functioning, 
strikes a jarring note. This reasoning finds further substance when 
the functioning of the impugned provision is explored. As per the 
Lok Sabha‟s unstarred question no. 819, dated 20th December 2017, 
only 30 FIR‟s have been filed with the police, since the inception of 
the Act. This number is relatively miniscule, keeping in view that 
Mr. Ravi Shankar Prasad argued in the Rajya Sabha that since 
December 2016, action had been taken against a 1,000 operators 
                                                          
73 Amber Sinha, Analysis of Key Provisions of the Aadhaar Act Regulations, 
The Centre for Internet and Society, (March 31st, 2017) https://cis-
india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-of-key-provisions-of-
aadhaar-act-regulations (last accessed on: 3rd October, 2018). 
74Supra note 10. 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 8, No.1                              ISSN 2278-4322 
 
22 
 
“who tried to pollute the system or tried to make fake Aadhaar 
cards”.75 
For a more robust Aadhaar system, it is required that there should 
be minimal dependence on biometric, that is, it should only be used 
by UIDAI for de-duplication and third party service providers 
should adopt other mechanisms like OTP, PIN etc. for 
authentication.76A valid concern arises against the correlation of 
identities across domains and the illegal tracking since the Aadhaar 
number is consistent in all domains.77The introduction of a 
temporary and revocable 16-digit Virtual ID can certainly prove to 
be effective. However, owing to its temporary nature, it cannot be 
used to undo duplication.78 Furthermore, as decryption keys are 
also stored in the Aadhaar system, insider attack poses a severe 
threat.79 Incorporation of certain tools and techniques from the 
branch of computer science such as homomorphic and functional 
encryption, storing hash of biometric data, symmetric searchable 
encryption and extensions become imperative.80It would prove to 
be beneficial to establish an independent third party, who is 
bestowed with the responsibility of the decryption key-keeper and 
auditor, under a different administrative control.81 The role of an 
independent key-keeper will address and diminish the threat of an 
insider attack, as a crucial part of the decryption key will remain 
solely with the third party.  
                                                          
75 Rajya Sabha, Short Duration Discussion, (April 10th, 2017) 
http://rsdebate.nic.in/handle/123456789/670853 (last accessed on 21st 
September, 2018) 
76Soumen Chakrabarti et al, A Question of Identity: What Should Aadhaar Be 
Like?, I.I.T. Bombay, 1, 7, https://www.cse.iitb.ac.in/ identity/ 
docs/aadhaar-whitepaper.pdf (last accessed on 21st September, 2018).  
77  Shweta Agrawal et al, Privacy and Security of Aadhaar: A Computer 
Science perspective, Computer Science and Engineering, I.I.T. Delhi, 1, 7 
http://www.cse.iitd.ernet.in/~suban/reports/aadhaar.pdf (last accessed 
on 4th April, 2018). 
78Infra note 83.  
79Supra note 77. 
80Supra note 77. 
81Supra note 77. 
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The collection and storage of Aadhaar numbers by various entities 
has heightened privacy concerns82 in light of which, substantial 
security measures were taken by the UIDAI. Through a circular 
dated, 10th January 2018,it introduced the option of Virtual ID - a 
temporary and revocable 16-digit random number, which could be 
used in lieu of the 12-digit Aadhaar number, to avail services and 
the issuance of a UID Token for agencies to uniquely identify their 
customer within their system.83 Apart from this, the said circular 
also entailed provisions for a Limited KYC in respect of “Local 
AUA‟s”, distinct from „Global AUA‟s‟ (Authentication User 
Agency). It can be amiably acknowledged that the circular was a 
step in the right direction, although it would have served better 
and effective if such measures were introduced at the time of 
initiation. These initiatives plays a vital role to partially alleviate 
security concerns for this ensures a delimitation of collection and 
data minimisation. However, reservations have been expressed 
against its effective implementation in the absence of any statutory 
backing.84 
5. International Scenario 
There have been several schemes similar to that of Aadhaar in 
other countries and the reasons behind their abandonment sets a 
reliable precedence of the problematic repercussions of such 
schemes. An illustrative instance in this regard will be of 
Philippines where on 12th December 1996, President Fidel Ramos 
issued an administrative order (A.O. No. 308) titled „Adoption of a 
National Computerized Identification Reference System‟, in the 
form of an ordinance. It was primarily based on two 
considerations. First, the need to provide citizens and foreigners 
with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic 
services, social security providers and other Government 
instrumentalities, and secondly, the need to reduce, if not totally 
                                                          
82Infra note 83. 
83 Authentication Division, UIDAI, Ministry of Electronics and 
Information Technology, Notification F. No. K- 11020/217/2018-UIDAI 
(Auth-I) https:// uidai.gov.in/ images/resource/ UIDAI_Circular 
_11012018.pdf (last accessed on 22nd March, 2018). 
84Infra note 125. 
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eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by 
persons seeking basic services. The essence of A.O. No. 308 was in 
Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number 
(PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage 
among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics 
Technology" and "computer application designs. 
The Supreme Court of the Republic of Philippines in an En banc 
session85 held such a system void and unconstitutional. The 
Administrative Order No. 308violated the constitutional right to 
privacy and was an undue and impermissible exercise of legislative 
power by the Executive. Justice Reynato S. Puno, categorically 
stated that “the data may be gathered to aid in easing Government 
functions, but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal 
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation 
that may be too great for some of our authorities to 
resist.”86 Moreover, the lack of proper safeguards may interfere 
with the individual's liberty to abode and travel, by enabling 
authorities to track his movement. It has the potential to enable 
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information, paving 
the way for the violation of right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, which is imposed on Governmental authorities. 
Administrative Order No. 308 was dangerous because it had the 
possibilities of intruding into the private lives of the citizens; a 
virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulder. 
While the Court held the system to be unconstitutional, it was not a 
unanimous decision. Furthermore, Kapunan,J. was inclined 
towards the advantages of such a scheme, when he observed that 
only one reliable and tamper-proof I.D. needed to be presented by 
the cardholder, instead of several identification papers in the 
transaction with Government agencies. He further observed that 
the new system would promote, facilitate and speed up legitimate 
transactions with Government offices as well as with private and 
business entities. The case of Philippines is similar to that of India, 
if not exactly the same. The UIDAI was constituted in pursuance of 
                                                          
85 Ople vs. Torres 293 S.C.R.A. 141 (1998). 
86Id. See also, Sloan, I. Law of Privacy Rights in a Technological Society, p. 
6 [1986]. 
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a Government of India notification-the noticeable difference being 
that in Philippines, the judgment was delivered before the 
Parliament brought out a statute. In India, the Government was 
able to bring the Act into force, by introducing it in the Parliament 
as a Money Bill. Philippines is not the only country where the 
highest Constitutional Court interceded to negate such a scheme. In 
France, the highest Constitutional authority i.e. Constitutional 
Council, through a petition by more than 200 opposing 
Parliamentarians, held unconstitutional a 10-Articles law passed by 
the lower house of the French Parliament (National 
Assembly),which proposed new biometric ID for its citizens.87The 
Court herein declared four Articles of the Identity Protection Act as 
unconstitutional along with certain parts of two more Articles. The 
Court acknowledged that there is a justified ground of general 
public interest, to improve the efficiency of the fight against fraud. 
However, the Court was of the view that traces of such biometric 
data are likely to be left unintentionally by the person, or collected 
without his knowledge. Building on this premise, the Court held 
that the impugned Articles are an infringement of the citizens‟ 
rights and „that it cannot be regarded as proportionate to the aim 
pursued.‟ 
It has not always been the Courts who restricted or did away with 
such schemes. The Governments of various nations have taken 
affirmative action to achieve similar ends. In the instance of U.K., 
the Identity Cards Act, 2006, was proposed with the aim of 
facilitating a secure and reliable recording of registrable facts of 
individuals and ensuring a convenient method for individuals to 
prove registrable facts about themselves.88 It also provided that an 
individual may be required to allow his fingerprints, and other 
biometric information, to be taken and recorded.89 However, this 
was repealed via the Identity Documents Act, 2010.90 The Act 
                                                          
87 Decision No. 2012-652 D.C of March 22, 2012; See also, EDRi, France: 
Biometric ID database found unconstitutional, European Digital Rights, 
March 28, 2012 https://edri.org/edrigramnumber10-6french-biometric-
database-unconstitutional/ (last accessed on 19th April, 2018). 
88 §3(1), Identity Cards Act, Act of Parliament, 2006 
89 §5(5) (b), Identity Cards Act, Act of Parliament, 2006 
90 §1(1), Identity Cards Act, Act of Parliament, 2006 
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provided for cancellation91 and destruction of any and all 
information that were recorded in the National Identity Register.92 
Some £250 m was spent on developing the national ID programme 
over a period of eight years and its abolition meant that the 
Government will avoid spending a further sum of £800m over the 
next decade,93 in securing the database. The Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, Theresa May, stated that “the national 
identity card scheme represents the worst of the Government. It is 
intrusive, ineffective and expensive. 
In the case of Australia, within a span of three decades after the 
formulation of an identity database, there were several attempts by 
the Government to pass a law mandating ID schemes, all of which 
were met with great resistance and opposition. The Government in 
the 1980‟swanted to introduce a Bill for an Australian Card, on the 
pretext of preventing losses to tax revenue through its 
medium.94The Bill, in its essence, was similar to that of Aadhaar, in 
that it did not mandate the possession of the Australian Card, yet 
the existence without one proved to be cumbersome and 
impossible.95In the year 1986, the Labour Government attempted to 
introduce Australia Card Bill, 1986 thrice - all of which, were 
rejected inter alia due to its repercussion on civil liberties. The 
report of the Joint Select Committee on this subject, in the light of 
past experience in U.S.A. and Canada spelled out that such an 
identification system shall not be introduced, and the majority 
expressed “concern at the effect of a national identification system 
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on the nature of Australian society and the civil liberties of 
individuals in that society”.96 
Thereupon, such card schemes remained to be a dead issue, until it 
resurfaced in the wake of the London bombings in mid-2005. The 
Prime Minister of Australia, John Winston Howard, who 
strenuously opposed this scheme earlier, reconsidered it and 
allowed the Identity Card Proposal 2005-06. However, in a Joint 
Press Conference on 26th April, 2006, the Government announced 
the discontinuance of any attempt to propose such a scheme 
because „the added advantages of an ID card were outweighed by 
the disadvantages.‟97 However, in the same press conference, the 
Prime Minister expressed his intention to introduce an access card, 
containing a smart chip, which was to replace other existing cards 
to avail health and welfare services.98 Consequently, a Human 
Services (Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill, 2007 was introduced 
aiming to establish a framework for the Health and Social Service 
Access Card. There were extensive arguments on the issues of 
privacy revolving around this Bill, with many Member of 
Parliaments including Ms. Anna Burke, Ms. Kelly Hoare, Mr. 
Warren Snowdon and Ms. Annette Ellis being on the forefront to 
raise this issue during the Second Hearing of Human Services 
(Enhanced Service Delivery) Bill, 2007 held on 27th day of February, 
2007. The Access card scheme was eventually abandoned by the 
newly elected Government, in December 2007.99 
                                                          
96 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Joint 
Committee on an Australia Card, May 1986https:// www.aph.gov.au/ 
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Significant_Reports/auscar
d/report/index (last accessed on 19th March, 2018). 
97 Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon John Howard MP Joint Press 
Conference with the Attorney-General, the Hon Philip Ruddock MP and 
the Minister for Human Services, the Hon Joe Hockey MP, Parliament 
House, Canberra, Beaconsfield Gold Mine, access card; Solomon Islands¸ April 
26th, 2006 https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/ search/ display/ 
display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/NNGJ6%22 (last accessed on 
28th August, 2018).  
98Id. 
99 Electronic Frontiers Australia Access Card/ National ID card, (February 
10th, 2008) https://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Privacy/accesscard.html (last 
accessed on 23rd March, 2018). 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 8, No.1                              ISSN 2278-4322 
 
28 
 
Furthermore, during the passage of the bill in the Rajya Sabha, the 
Finance Minister Mr. Arun Jaitley drew an analogy between the 
Social Security Number (SSN) in the United States and Aadhaar, 
terming the legislations in respect of these, as „similar‟ 
legislations.100 It therefore becomes pertinent to look into the merit 
of this argument. Despite the comparison, there are significant 
differences between them. SSN does not have a biometric identifier 
attached to it and neither does it support authentication.101 
Assuming arguendo that the argument of Hon‟ble minister holds 
any water, and then too, it is fitting to mention that, there are 
various laws in the U.S.A. to restrict the use of SSN. Federal laws 
that require the use of an SSN, generally limit its use to the 
statutory purposes described in each of the laws.102 For example, 
the Internal Revenue Code, which requires the use of SSNs for 
certain purposes, declares tax return information, to be confidential 
and prescribes both civil and criminal penalties for unauthorized 
disclosure.103 Besides, with SSNs being identified as the universal 
identifiers, its dangers were recognized early on, and the Congress 
passed the Privacy Act of 1974,104 to curb these dangers. Moreover, 
in spite of several Federal and State laws being in place to restrict 
its use, SSN has exposed itself to gross misuse including identity 
theft. It was estimated by the Federal Trade Commission that over 
a period of one year, around 10 million people, who constitute 4.6 
per cent of the adult population, discovered that they had fallen 
prey to some kind of identity theft, which translated into reported 
losses exceeding $50 billion.105 
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6. The Constitutional Validity of Aadhaar 
Technology has rapidly altered the course of our life and reshaped 
our fundamental understanding of information. This has resulted 
almost in a sort of a permanent storage of information in some way 
or the other, making it difficult to begin life again by giving up past 
mistakes.106 Thus, apart from admitted advantages of technology, 
there are few drawbacks limitations to it. The nine-judge Bench in 
the Privacy judgement was conscious of the downside of 
technology, which is explicit in the concurring judgment of Justice 
Sanjay Kishan Kaul wherein his lordship observed that 
“technology has made it possible to enter a citizen‟s house without 
knocking at his/her door and this is equally possible both by the 
State and non-State actors.” Our quest for technology should not be 
oblivious to the country‟s real problems: social exclusion, 
impoverishment and marginalisation.107 
The Privacy judgement brings out that the right to privacy is not a 
mere instrument, but has several intrinsically complicated facets to 
it. The scope of this right was considerably broadened by the 
observations made by Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice 
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, that the right to privacy is inalienable and 
inherent in an individual. An equally important aspect of this 
judgement is that Justice Nariman, refused to accept the Union‟s 
contention that the right to privacy is not fundamental in a 
developing nation, where people do not have access to food, shelter 
and other resources. This right is available to both the poor and the 
rich.  
The standard of review of privacy violations can be adjudged in 
light of the judgment rendered by Justice S.A. Bobde, wherein, he 
states what the standard test has to be maintained while 
determining the constitutionality of a law. The standard test is a 
rationality test as expressed in Maneka Gandhi‟s108case, which 
requires that the law under which the state interferes with the 
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personal liberty of an individual(s), must be fair, just, reasonable 
and not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. In extension, any law 
purporting to violate privacy has to pass the muster of a three-fold 
test laid down by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, in Privacy judgment. 
The test demanded, at the foremost, that the „existence of law‟ be 
backed by „legitimate state interest‟ which will in turn have to pass 
the „test of proportionality‟. Proportionality principles seek to 
safeguard citizens from excessive Government measures.109Justice 
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, in the Privacy judgment, by citing various 
legal precedents, reiterated that the Courts should tread warily 
while making evaluations relating to social and economic policy in 
which they lack expertise. 
The focal point of the Aadhaar Act is the use of money belonging to 
the consolidated fund of the Centre or State governments of 
India.110 In contrast, the reasoning given in the Parliament, by Mr. 
Jairam Ramesh, that is “Aadhaar does not determine who is eligible and 
who is not eligible. Please get us rid of this myth. Aadhaar is proof of 
identity. It says if I am eligible, I am who I am. It does not determine that 
just because I have my Aadhaar number, I am entitled to subsidy.”111 
Therefore, Aadhaar in itself cannot prove to be the single silver 
bullet to address the concern of leakages in various subsidies and 
benefits. A collective and integrated approach of the government 
and its agencies is required on various fronts. Similarly, the 
Economic Survey 2016-17, which is an official document of the 
Union Government, notes that “while Aadhaar is designed to solve 
the identification problem, it cannot solve the „targeting problem‟ 
on its own.”112 This is further clear when the same Survey point 
towards the states‟ report on authentication failures. The estimates 
run as high as 49 percent failure rates in Jharkhand, 6 percent in 
Gujarat, 5 percent in Krishna District in Andhra Pradesh and 37 
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percent in Rajasthan. This has the potential to turn Aadhaar, 
purported to be a tool for social inclusion, into an instrument of 
social exclusion. A centralised and inter-linked database like 
Aadhaar paralyzes one‟s privacy from every nook and cranny. 
Therefore, the court has considerably restricted the scope of 
Aadhaar. However, while upholding Aadhaar, the court did not 
ventured to decide upon whether such a centralised and inter-
linked database passes the „least intrusive‟ test in achieving its 
objective. The concurring opinion spells out that this test cannot be 
insisted upon, because such a comparative analysis of the available 
identification methods is a question best left to experts.113 
The Government must have had a justifiable ground for efficiently 
transferring its subsidies and benefits to the needy, and at face 
value, Aadhaar appears to be a powerful instrument for achieving 
this. However it has strayed too far from its originally intended 
purpose. The absence of a viable alternative means for 
identification in rolling out the mandatory national identity card, 
Aadhaar, can have detrimental effects.  
Natural factors can alter the biometric information of an individual 
in course of lifetime.114In 2011, the Standing Committee on Finance 
was reprimanded for estimated failures of biometric which 
amounted to as 15% on account of the dependence of a substantial 
portion of the population on manual labour. Over time, finger-print 
can lose its accuracy owing to wear and tear, age, illness or 
personal injuries.115The iris scan on the other hand, promises 
reduced errors when compared to fingerprints. However, there are 
demanding complications attached to it as well. In keeping with the 
humongous size of population, there is a likelihood of degradation 
either because of disease or the effect of aging.116 Additionally, the 
iris can also be hindered by specular reflection in uncontrolled 
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lighting situations.117 UIDAI has claimed the biometric accuracy to 
be 99.76%.118 The remaining 0.232% may seem irrelevant or minute, 
but in a land where the population 110 crore, this miniscule 
percentage will result in the exclusion of 27.60 lakh people. This 
apprehension has been partly dealt with, by the UIDAI circular of 
2017.119 This in itself exhibits that, an identity scheme, almost a 
decade old identity scheme, is still a work-in progress. In 
retrospect, this highlights one of the particular distresses relating to 
Aadhaar - that a scheme which should have been much deliberated 
when it was still on the drawing board and rolled out with wide 
political consensus, has unfortunately become a political hot-
potato.  
As per the Lok Sabha unstarred question no. 1788, it is clear that 
the Government has incurred exorbitant amount towards 
enrolment and logistics, which is to the tune of Rs. 9,055.73 Crores. 
At the same time, the Act contains various troublesome provisions 
which pose a potential threat to privacy. Nonetheless, the mere 
possibility of the abuse of a provision of law does not invalidate the 
legislation, per se.120 In this regard, the Aadhaar judgement has to a 
large extent dealt with the apprehension raised and consequently 
either struck down or read down many of these provisions. 
However, since the Act was not justified to be passed as a Money 
Bill, the logical conclusion would have been to strike it down as a 
whole, while leaving it open for the Parliament to bring in a new 
legislation in this regard without undermining the authority of 
Rajya Sabha. This view was also highlighted in the dissenting 
opinion,121 which by extension, holds that until such time that the 
data is stored, keeping in mind the sensitivity of data, it should not 
be used by the Government in any manner, whatsoever. 
Furthermore, in this hue, the Aadhaar judgment has also read down 
                                                          
117 Nancy Yue Liu, Bio-Privacy: Privacy Regulations and the Challenge of 
Biometrics, 68 A Glass House Book (2012).  
118Supra note 10. 
119Supra note 65. 
120 A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. Venkatachalam Potti, Authorised Official 
and Income Tax Officer and Anr., A.I.R. (1956) S.C. 246; Sushil Kumar 
Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 S.C.C. 281. 
121Supra note 10. 
Naved and Kaushal           Aadhaar: Implementations & Implication 
33 
 
section 27(1) of Aadhaar (Authentication) Regulations, 2016 which 
allowed the authentication records to be archived for five years.122 
The court found it to be arbitrary and has held that such records 
cannot be kept beyond a period of six months. 
The Aadhaar judgment does not deal completely with the concerns 
relating to Aadhaar. The judgment has set a legislative agenda, and 
it is yet to be seen how adequately the Parliament deals with these 
issues. Concurrently, the paramount and urgent requirement is for 
the Parliament to bring in a robust regime for data protection. In 
both the Privacy123and the Aadhaar124judgment, the need for the 
same has been expressed and the judges had „hope‟ for such a 
framework, when it was intimated that a Committee of Experts be 
constituted, under the chairmanship of the former judge of the 
Supreme Court, Mr. Justice B.N. Srikrishna, to deliberate on a data 
protection regime for India.  
The Committee of Experts on Data Protection Framework for India, 
submitted in July 2018, its report and draft Bill to the Ministry of 
Electronics and Information Technology.125 The Committee inter 
alia suggested a slew of amendments to the Act, in order to bolster 
the protection of privacy.  Since the Committee was mindful of the 
fact that it was not entrusted with the task of suggesting 
amendments to other statutes, it only proposed such amendments 
as were necessary to bring the allied laws, including the Aadhaar 
Act, in conformity with the data protection framework. Some 
suggestions include equipping UIDAI with powers akin to 
traditional regulator (like SEBI) for enforcement, bolstering 
financial autonomy, classifying requesting entities into groups to 
efficiently regulate access of personal data on the basis of necessity, 
etc. These are certainly welcome changes which will breathe new 
life into the data protection regime.  While the Court cannot 
theoretically direct the Parliament to enact a law due to the 
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doctrine of separation of powers, there are several authorities that 
serve as precedents to the contrary. In Gainda Ram &Ors. v. M.C.D. 
&Ors.,126 the Supreme Court directed the competent Government to 
frame an appropriate law to regulate hawking. The Court passed 
such orders “in exercise of its jurisdiction to protect the 
fundamental right of the citizens.” In addition to this, in Smt. Seema 
v. Ashwani Kumar,127 the Court directed the concerned Government 
to frame appropriate Rules, within a stipulated time, pertaining to 
the mandatory registration of marriages, which will then be placed 
before the Court for scrutiny. 
As a point of information, it is not the first time that a Group of 
Experts have submitted their report in this context. The Planning 
Commission of India constituted a Group of Experts on privacy, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice A.P. Shah, former Chief 
Justice of Delhi High Court, which submitted its report in 2012 and 
no concrete action was taken in the furtherance of its 
recommendations. The report inter alia suggested the inculcation of 
a discretionary provision that enables the citizens to either opt into 
the Aadhaar scheme or not, which was disregarded by the 
legislature. The inescapable characteristic of Aadhaar needs to be 
addressed and eradicated. 
7. Conclusion 
The information and the data of citizens stored under the veneer of 
national interest, extracts oil which was indiscriminately and 
recklessly ransacked by a drilling machine, namely Aadhaar. At the 
outset, it may be conceded that earlier there might have been noble 
intentions in the introduction of Aadhaar, but eventually it has 
become a force to be reckoned with, especially because of the haste 
with which the Governments, both previous and current, made it 
obligatory for virtually everything. 
The Aadhaar judgment has certainly put a halt on the Government‟s 
quest in making Aadhaar the only means of identification.128The 
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Supreme Court‟s pronouncement on Aadhaar has resulted in both 
sides of the case claiming a „qualified‟ victory. The 1,448 pages 
judgment offers both positive and negative perspective pertaining 
to Aadhaar. The judicial review in itself does not invalidate a law 
or a particular provision, and the Parliament tinkers with the 
impugned law by incorporating appropriate amendments.129 
Accordingly, in doing so, the Government will have to regard the 
object of law, apprehensions posed in judgment, and convenience 
of the people.130Be that as it may, a fine tuning of the law is much 
required with the help of consultative process. It seems to be a 
major legislative agenda before the Parliament, in the upcoming 
session. Apart from this, subsequent implementation of it is yet to 
be witnessed. In the absence of comprehensive privacy legislation, 
the Government was enabled to use brute force and guile in order 
to become omnipresent. Therefore, irrespective of the fate of 
Aadhaar, a much awaited data protection regime, in line with B.N. 
Srikrishna Committee Report, is a necessity, in the light of rapid 
technological advancements. While evaluating privacy 
consequences of biometric technology, it is also important to bear 
in mind whether the current privacy protections which may be 
adequate for the present state of technology, will be sufficient in the 
future.131 
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